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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondents accept the jurisdictional statement set out in Petitioner's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are properly characterized as follows: 
1. Did the Board err in its factual findings relating to the dealings 
between the parties, (a) that the terms and conditions of the verbal and written 
offers presented to Petitioner's landowners (hereinafter "Landowners") to lease or 
join the Drunkard's Wash Federal Unit (hereinafter "DW Unit") and the 
notifications concerning the drilling of the Utah 5-94 Well (the "5-94 Well") and 
the Woolstenhulme 5-266 Well (the "5-266 Well") (hereafter jointly the "Wells") 
were reasonable and in good faith, (b) that Respondents relied in good faith on the 
responses and lack of responses of the Landowners, and (c) that the Landowners 
knew or reasonably should have known of the facts surrounding the existence and 
operation of the DW Unit and of the drilling of the Wells? (Findings of Fact Nos. 
5-11.) 
Standard of Review: The applicable standard of review of the Board's factual 
findings is provided in the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l et seq. ("UAPA"), and particularly in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
Factual findings must be affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Such findings will "not be 
i 
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the 
evidence is permissible." Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
1998) (quoting Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 
(Utah 1988)). A party seeking to overturn factual findings must marshal all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that "despite the supporting facts, and in 
light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Comm% 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). See also In re Sam Oil, Inc., 817 P.2d 
299, 302 (Utah 1991) (Board findings of fact in adjudication under the Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 et seq. ("Conservation Act"), are 
reviewed under the substantial evidence test of § 63-46b-16(4)(g)); and Bennion v. ANR 
Production Co., 819 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1991) (factual findings relating to the amount 
to be imposed as a nonconsent penalty under the Conservation Act are reviewed under 
the substantial evidence test, giving deference to the agency's findings). In making a 
review of factual findings, the court considers the facts "and all legitimate inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's findings." Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the Board err in failing to order pooling retroactive to the dates 
of first production of the Wells? 
Standard of Review: The rule regarding retroactive pooling under the 
2 
Conservation Act as a matter of law was announced and firmly established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 830 P.2d 220, 228-229 
(Utah 1991). Cowling held that a pooling order cannot be made retroactive to a date 
prior to the entry of a spacing order. Id. at 228. A possible exception to that rule was 
postulated by dictum in Cowling, supra, in the event of inequitable conduct. Id. at 228. 
Thus, whether or not the Board erred in failing to order retroactive pooling is 
necessarily a question of fact, or at most, a mixed question of law and fact, that of 
whether or not there was inequitable conduct. Respondents believe that the substantial 
evidence test described with Issue No. 1 above should also be used to review the factual 
finding that there was no inequitable conduct on the part of Respondents. At most, 
such a finding is a mixed question of law and fact, or an application of the facts to the 
law, subject to the "intermediate" arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard 
(also referred to as the "reasonableness and rationality" standard), giving substantial 
deference to the Board's findings and conclusions, under § 63-46b-16(4)(h). Morton 
Internat'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div'n of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
3. Did the Board err in its finding that the Wells, for purposes of 
imposing a risk penalty under the facts of this case, and for no other purpose, 
constitute exploratory wells? (Finding of Fact No. 15). 
Standard of Review: This determination requires special expertise. The 
applicable standard of review of findings in which the agency's special expertise "puts 
it in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in 
light of the agency's mission" is the intermediate standard of reasonableness and 
rationality, giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions. See, 
e.g., Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 
(Utah 1996) (issues of highly technical nature concerning wildcat status of wells 
remanded for the Board to consider and decide). See also Morton, supra, 814 P.2d at 
588, n. 41 (and accompanying citations) and 589, n. 46, 47 and 48 (and accompanying 
citations); Savage, supra, 811 P.2d at 667-68; Hurley, supra. 
4. Did the Board err in ruling that Petitioner and his Landowners were 
nonconsenting owners and err by imposing a nonconsent penalty upon Petitioner? 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether Petitioner and the 
Landowners were nonconsenting owners is a finding which the agency's expertise "puts 
it in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances in light of the 
agency's mission," and should be reviewed under the standard described in connection 
with Issue No. 3 above, giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and 
conclusions. 
5, Did the Board abuse its discretion in determining the terms and 
conditions of the pooling order, and were those terms and conditions just and 
reasonable as required under the Conservation Act? 
Standard of Review: Whether the Board abused its discretion is reviewed under 
the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard (reasonableness and 
rationality), giving substantial deference to the Board's findings and conclusions. 
Whether the terms and conditions of the pooling order are just and reasonable is also 
determined under the arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion standard 
(reasonableness and rationality), giving deference to the Board's findings and 
conclusions, as in Sam Oil, supra, and Bennion v. ANR Production Co., supra; Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner seeks review of a pooling order (the "Pooling Order"), attached to the 
Petitioner's Brief as Appendix 3, issued by the Board under the provisions of the 
Conservation Act. Even though the spacing order on which the Pooling Order was 
based (the "Spacing Order") was not entered until January 26, 2000, the Petitioner 
seeks to have the Pooling Order made retroactive to predate the Spacing Order and be 
effective as of the dates of first production of the Wells, being November 7, 1995 (for 
the 5-94 Well) and December 1998 (for the 5-266 Well). In addition, the Petitioner 
seeks a review of the Pooling Order to the extent that it finds that the Petitioner and the 
Landowners were nonconsenting owners and imposes a nonconsent penalty on the 
interest of Petitioner. 
In October of 1999, Petitioner filed a Request for Agency Action with the Board 
to establish 160-acre drilling units around each of the Wells pursuant to the 
Conservation Act. (R. 2-9.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the Board issued the 
Spacing Order, Cause No. 243-3, effective January 26, 2000, establishing a 160-acre 
drilling unit around each of the Wells. (R. 223-234.) The Board also specifically 
denied Petitioner's request to make spacing effective as of the dates of first production 
(R. 230) and Petitioner did not appeal that order of the Board. 
On June 12, 2000, after unsuccessful negotiations to establish voluntary pooling, 
Petitioner filed a Request for Agency Action pursuant to the pooling provisions of the 
Conservation Act (Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6.5), requesting the Board to pool the 
interests in the drilling units established by the Spacing Order. (R. 238-248.) 
Following an evidentiary hearing on August 23, 2000, the Board issued the Pooling 
Order, Cause No. 243-5. (R. 555.) 
The Board pooled all interests within each of the drilling units containing the 
Wells. (R. 558.) The Board made the Pooling Order effective as of the date of the 
Spacing Order and denied Petitioner's request that pooling be made effective as of the 
dates of first production from the Wells. (R. 564.) The Board also imposed upon the 
Petitioner a nonconsent penalty of 225 % of his share of the costs of drilling the wells 
chargeable against his share of production commencing after the effective date of the 
Spacing Order. (R. 565.) 
On October 27, 2000, Petitioner filed his Petition for Review of the Pooling 
Order contending that the Board erred (1) by failing to make pooling effective as of the 
dates of first production from the Wells; (2) by declaring him and the Landowners to be 
nonconsenting owners; and (3) by imposing upon him a 225% nonconsent penalty 
charged against his share of production after the effective date of the Spacing Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Drunkards Wash Unit. 
The DW Unit was approved effective December 28, 1990 as a Federal 
exploratory unit and is administered by the Utah State Office of the United States 
Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). The DW Unit, after six expansions and one 
contraction, now covers 89,415.25 acres in Carbon and Emery Counties. The 
governing Unit Agreement is a voluntary agreement for the development of a coalbed 
methane gas reservoir that effectively pools all of the interests of those owners and 
lessees who join it. It was, at all times relevant to this appeal, ratified by over ninety 
(90%) percent of the mineral owners within the area encompassed by the DW Unit and 
their lessees. The DW Unit covers oil and gas producible from all formations, 
including coalbed methane producible from the Ferron formation. The lands 
encompassing Petitioner's interests have, since the initial unit formation in 1990, been 
included within the physical boundaries of the DW Unit. (R. 103.) 
As required under Federal regulations governing Federal exploratory unit 
formation and operations (see 43C.F.R. §3181.3, attached hereto as Addendum 1), all 
of the uncommitted owners in the captioned lands were provided opportunities to join 
the DW Unit. In addition, and beyond the minimum requirements, Respondents, 
through River Gas as operator of the DW Unit,1 offered to lease all of the uncommitted 
owners' interests, including the Landowners. While many owners did join or lease, the 
Landowners refused, either affirmatively or by their non-responsiveness, to either lease 
their interest or otherwise join the DW Unit. A significant portion of the interests held 
within the DW Unit were those of the State of Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration ("SITLA"). (R. 216; 573; Tr. 150.)2 SITLA was among the 
owners opting to include their interests in the DW Unit and participate therein. Id. 
B. Attempts To Have The Landowners Lease Or Join The DW 
Unit. 
With respect to the Landowners, River Gas had been informed and assured that 
LaRue Layne represented all of them, and that all dealings and offers concerning the 
property were to go through her. (R. 573; Tr. 135.) Accordingly, Mrs. Layne was 
contacted and sent offers to lease the property in January 1991 as well as in June 1991. 
(R. 352-357; Record at 573; Tr. 129-132.) In spite of those two separate offers to 
lease and a number of telephone conversations with her (R. 352; 358-359), Mrs. Layne 
1
 The DW Unit was originally operated by River Gas of Utah, Inc. ("RGU"), which 
was succeeded by River Gas Corporation ("RGC") and Phillips Petroleum Company 
through merger. At all times relevant to this appeal, the unit was operated by RGU or 
RGC (collectively hereafter "River Gas"), for and on behalf of Respondents River Gas 
Corporation, Texaco Exploration and Production Inc., and Dominion Resources -
Utah, Inc. 
2
 References to the August 23, 2000 hearing transcript are to transcript page numbers. 
O 
did not respond. (R. 573; Tr. 131-132) After Mrs. Layne did not respond to offers to 
lease her property, she was again contacted in November 1991 with a formal invitation 
to allow her the opportunity to commit the Landowners' interest to the DW Unit.3 (R. 
360-364; Record at 573; Tr. 133.) That invitation asked her to consider joining the 
unit and offered to answer any questions she might have concerning the offer. Id. As 
with the offers to lease, Mrs. Layne did not respond to the November 1991 offer to join 
the DW Unit. (R. 573; Tr. 135.) 
Following those efforts, River Gas contacted Mrs. Layne by telephone, 
negotiated a lease, sent her a proposed lease in duplicate on September 14, 1993 with a 
bank draft, and disclosed to her its plans to have 33 wells producing by the end of 
1993. (R. 365.) Mrs. Layne asked some questions of River Gas' representative, which 
were answered on October 18, 1993 (R. 366), and the lease negotiations remained 
open. The offer was reiterated and the unit operations further explained by River Gas 
by letter dated November 3, 1993. (R. 367; Record at 573; Tr. 138-141.) When Mrs. 
Layne did not respond to those offers and reiterations of offers to lease, yet another 
offer was sent to her, following additional telephone conversations. River Gas' 
representative sent a letter dated January 31, 1995 to Mrs. Layne offering another 
opportunity to lease and answering questions. (R. 368; Record at 573; Tr. 141.) After 
3
 The invitation was sent to her by certified mail and was received in November 1991, 
and was the standard letter that was sent to all parties that owned an interest in the DW 
Unit area. (R. 573; Tr. 134.) A copy of the invitation that was sent to Mrs. Layne, 
together with the returned receipt evidencing delivery, are included at R. 360-364. 
answering a few questions that were asked in another telephone conversation (R. 370), 
several more telephone conversations occurred (R. 371-372) concerning various topics 
relating to rights-of-way and leasing, and another letter was sent on March 28, 1995 
notifying Mrs. Layne of the locations of wells that were planned to be drilled in the 
same section of land as her property interests. (R. 374-375; Record at 573; Tr. 142.) 
None of the above offers, including letters, telephone conversations and 
notifications of plans to drill in the vicinity of the Landowners' property interests 
produced any results. Nevertheless, River Gas thereafter sent yet another offer to lease 
or commit the working interest of the Landowners to the DW Unit, by certified letter 
dated July 20, 1995. (R. 376; Record at 573; Tr. 149-151.) This letter, sent four 
months before drilling the 5-94 well, was sent not only to Mrs. Layne, but to all the 
Landowners, and stated clearly [summarizing]: 
1. That the Landowners' interests were within the DW Unit; 
2. That other owners of the same tracts in which the Landowners held an 
interest had been offered a lease; 
3. That in the letter River Gas was providing them yet another opportunity to 
elect to join the DW Unit on a working interest basis or lease their 
interests, as well as the proposed terms of such lease; 
4. That if the Landowners chose to lease, River Gas would allow them to 
reap the benefits of unit production without bearing any pre-production 
expenses; 
5. The terms of the conditions, in reasonable detail, of the unit operating 
agreement (a copy of which was attached to the letter) that would apply in 
the event they elected to join the DW Unit; and 
6. That if no response was sent back to River Gas within 30 days, River Gas 
would deem that they declined to lease or commit to the unit. 
Notably, in the July 20, 1995 letters, River Gas strongly suggested that the Landowners 
"read the enclosed documents carefully and, if deemed necessary, seek advice of 
qualified legal counsel/9 (R. 378.) 
Those July 20, 1995 letters sent to all Landowners offered participation in the 
DW Unit as working interest owners on the same terms as any other working interest 
owners in their respective positions (including the sharing of costs and revenues under 
the unitization provisions). (R. 376-378.) Consequently, all of the Landowners knew 
or should have known of the plans of River Gas, as DW Unit operator, to drill on the 
captioned lands. No Landowner consented in advance to the drilling of any of the wells 
or agreed to bear his proportionate share of the cost thereof. (R. 573; Tr. 151; 159-
160.) 
In each and every correspondence to them, River Gas invited the Landowners to 
contact it with any questions. Although questions were asked by them, the Landowners 
simply failed to respond to the offers. At no time did the Landowners ever express any 
objections to River Gas' offers or offer any counterproposals. See generally, Record at 
573; Transcript 128-162. 
Two of the Landowners, Terry Olsen and Rita Beck, were present and available 
to testify in the Board proceedings below. (R. 573; Tr. 5.) However, Petitioner chose 
not to call either of them to offer any evidence that might controvert any of the Board's 
factual findings. {See e.g., Record at 573; Tr. 86-89.) Thus, all of the evidence 
concerning the offers, proposals, telephone conversations, correspondence, certified 
letters, etc. communicated to the Landowners as presented at the Board hearing is 
entirely uncontroverted on the Record. 
C. Well History And Associated Risks 
River Gas, as DW Unit operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-94 Well 
pursuant to the unit operating agreement, and in accordance with the description of unit 
operations as explained in the correspondence to the Landowners, on Lot 4 (the 
NW^NWVi) of Section 5 on September 11, 1995. It was completed it as a coalbed 
methane well in the Ferron formation on November 7, 1995. In addition, River Gas, 
as DW Unit operator, commenced the drilling of the 5-266 Well pursuant to the unit 
operating agreement, and in accordance with the description of unit operations as 
explained in advance in further correspondence and conversations with various of the 
Landowners (R. 573; Tr. 157-160), on the SW!4NE!4 of Section 5 on November 12, 
1998. It was completed it as a coalbed methane well in the Ferron formation on 
December 23, 1998. (R. 310.) Both wells are located on leaseholds owned solely by 
Respondents. (R. 308-310.) Prior to drilling, the locations of both wells were 
authorized by virtue of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining's (the "Division's") 
approval of applications for permit to drill and were ratified by the Board's subsequent 
order entered in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999. (R. 310.) Petitioner also did not 
seek appeal of that order. 
Respondents presented expert testimony of Mr. Mike Farrens at the Board 
hearing which established the numerous risks associated with drilling the two Wells. 
First, the thickness of the coal seam in the area, at the edge of the Ferron formation, 
and corresponding concerns about potential reserves and production, were of significant 
concern; it was not clear whether the Wells would hit any economic zone to yield 
profitable production. (R. 573; Tr. 196-197; 199; 203-208.) Second, the costs and 
difficulties associated with water disposal and whether or not the potentially large 
quantity of water, anticipated to contain high levels of total dissolved solids, would be 
able to be disposed with the Price Water Improvement District, were also of great 
concern. (R. 573; Tr. 184-185; 198-202.) Third, costs and economic justification for 
installing gas lines and gathering systems and adequate compressing capacity were of 
significant concern. (R. 573; Tr. 185; 192-195.) Fourth, the appropriate acreage that 
would be drained by a well in that area was also of concern, since the 160-acre spacing 
had also been of concern elsewhere in the DW Unit, and since 160-acre spacing was 
somewhat arbitrarily used for environmental reasons (to keep the number of wells 
drilled and the disturbance at a minimum in certain sensitive areas) under the 
Environmental Impact Statement under which the drilling in the DW Unit was 
evaluated. (R. 573; Tr. 189-190.) 
D. Petitioner's Acquisition Of Leases From The Landowners, 
On June 21, 1999, Petitioner acquired leases from the Landowners on terms no 
more favorable than River Gas had previously offered, except for a clause which 
prohibits Petitioner's joinder of the leases to the DW Unit without the Landowners' 
express consent. (R. 311.) In sworn testimony, Petitioner admitted he made no inquiry 
of River Gas regarding the status of the 5-94 and 5-266 Wells and the Landowner 
interests prior to his acquisition of the leases, even though he was aware that the 
captioned lands were within the physical boundaries of the DW Unit, and was also 
aware of the existence of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells and River Gas' operation of them 
pursuant to the unit agreement. (R. 573; Tr. 96.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner and his landowners had numerous opportunities to participate in the 
drilling of the Wells, or to drill their own wells, or to seek a spacing order at any 
"earlier time." See e.g., Cowling, 830 P.2d at 222. Such opportunities included 
numerous offers to lease or join the DW Unit that were forwarded to the Landowners 
by Respondents on many occasions. The good faith offers of participation in the DW 
Unit or to lease their interests satisfied any and all requirements incumbent upon 
Respondents under the Conservation Act or the common law. Respondents engaged in 
no "inequitable conduct" and had no duty to seek spacing or otherwise protect any 
correlative rights of Landowners and Petitioner. Under the law of capture, the 
Conservation Act, and Utah case law interpreting the same, the Board acted properly 
under the facts of this case in ordering pooling effective as of the date of the Spacing 
Order and not prior thereto. 
The Board order finding that the Landowners and the Petitioner were 
nonconsenting owners was entirely proper due to the Landowners' failure to consent to 
drilling or otherwise respond to good faith offers to join the DW Unit or to lease their 
interests. The conferring of nonconsenting owner status on the Petitioner was also 
proper since he stands in the shoes of the Landowners as their lessee. In addition, the 
Board order that the drilling of the Wells involved "moderate risk" was supported by 
substantial evidence and the imposition of the 225% nonconsent penalty was 
appropriate under the circumstances and supported by substantial evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH HAS ADOPTED THE RULE THAT POOLING 
CANNOT BE MADE RETROACTIVE TO A TIME PRIOR 
TO THE DATE OF A SPACING ORDER. 
A. The Law Of Capture In Utah, 
The court in Cowling succinctly expressed the essence of the law of capture: 
Under the common law of capture, a landowner could drill 
for oil or gas on its land wherever and with as many wells as 
the landowner thought appropriate. If oil or gas were 
found, the landowner would not be liable to adjacent 
landowners whose lands were also drained, even if the 
producing well were drilled next to the adjoining 
landowner's boundary. Moreover, the producing landowner 
would be entitled to produce as much oil or gas as possible, 
even though the ultimate recovery of oil or gas from the 
reservoir was diminished. Thus, under the law of capture, a 
landowner incurred no liability for causing oil or gas to 
migrate across property boundaries and was not required to 
compensate adjoining landowners for draining oil and gas 
from their lands. 
830 P.2d at 224 [citations omitted]. The Cowling court also explained the basis for the 
emergence of the Conservation Act: 
This [law of capture] produced results that were unfair to 
many landowners and development practices that were 
uneconomical or wasteful for all. Thus, it encouraged the 
drilling of more wells than necessary to drain a field, and it 
permitted techniques and rates of production that augmented 
the profits of the property owner whose land was producing, 
but wasted the resources of the field as a whole. 
Id. (quoting Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 
(Utah 1983)). The court then observed: 
In 1955, the Legislature enacted the Utah Oil and Gas 
Conservation Act. That Act modified the law of capture and 
established the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to 
regulate the development and production of oil and gas in 
the state for the purpose of preventing waste and protecting 
correlative rights. The Act was amended and superseded by 
the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1983. 
Id. at 224-225. 
B. Cowling Reinforces The Law Of Capture And The Adjoining 
Landowner's Responsibility To Protect His Own Interests. 
Cowling firmly announced the rule that a pooling order cannot be made 
retroactive to a time prior to the date of a spacing order. 830 P.2d at 228-229. The 
court illuminated the interface between the law of capture and the Conservation Act, 
stating that the Conservation Act's objectives (to prevent waste, provide for 
development, maximize recovery, and protect the correlative rights of all owners) are 
"significantly interrelated" to the law of capture. Cowling held that the law of capture 
is abrogated only to the extent that it conflicts with the Conservation Act. Id. at 225.4 
The court examined the anatomy of the term "correlative rights." Referring to 
its definition, "the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable 
share of the oil and gas in a pool without waste," the court reasoned that "the statute 
makes individual correlative rights dependent upon the overriding objective of obtaining 
the greatest production possible from the pool, and not from any particular well or 
property." Id. at 224 (emphases added). The court explained that a correlative right is 
nothing more than an "opportunity" to produce a "just and equitable share" of oil and 
gas "without waste," and that correlative rights do not confer a mineral interest owner 
with an "absolute right to all the oil or gas under one's land." Id. 
The court identified various "opportunities" afforded a landowner to eliminate 
any negative effects of the law of capture prior to entry of a spacing order: 
Rule C-3(e) expressly allows an adjoining interest owner to 
petition the Board for an exception location. An adjoining 
mineral estate owner who is prevented from drilling a well 
may also seek to enter into a voluntary pooling agreement to 
protect that interest. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5). 
4
 See description in Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., 849 P.2d 569, 572, n. 3 
(Utah 1993). 
17 
830 P.2d at 228. In other words, in addition to leasing {see Cowling at 226), a 
landowner can drill his or her own well (including seeking an exception location if 
necessary) or negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement. A Federal exploratory unit 
agreement, such as the DW Unit Agreement, clearly constitutes such an agreement. 
Thus, Cowling made clear there are numerous alternatives available to an owner 
to take action to establish and protect his interest prior to the entry of a spacing order, 
including voluntarily joining a unit agreement. The court held that an owner's failure 
to take any such action constitutes a waiver of that interest until the spacing order is 
established. Id. at 228; see also Adkins v. Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 926 P.2d 
880, 884 (Utah 1996). 
The court also charted the boundaries of spacing and pooling and examined the 
concept of retroactivity in relation thereto. It left immovable its pronouncement that the 
"mechanism for defining correlative rights in a pool of oil or gas is a spacing order." 
Id. at 227. The court pronounced that § 40-6-6(5) authorizes pooling orders to be 
entered only with respect to "established drilling units" (areas where a spacing order is 
in effect), and that the statutory scheme itself does not contemplate the result that a 
pooling order would be made retroactive prior to the date of the spacing order. Id.5 
5
 The court differentiated Bennion v. Bd of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 
1983), decided under the previous version of the statute. The court stated that Bennion 
does not require pooling to be retroactive to first production, and limited it to its facts: 
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Cowling makes clear that the law of capture is the law that governs in Utah, 
except as specifically modified by the Conservation Act. Specifically, Cowling 
demonstrates that until a spacing order is entered, the Conservation Act has no bearing 
on the activities and interests of operators vis-a-vis adjacent landowners and only the 
law of capture applies, and that owners who fail to avail themselves of the 
"opportunity" presented to them in the form of their correlative rights through 
(1) leasing; (2) voluntarily pooling or unitization, (3) drilling their own well; or 
(4) petitioning the Board for spacing, waive those rights under the law of capture until 
such time as a spacing order applies.6 Cowling instructs that to place any duty on an 
operator to seek spacing flies in the face of the law of capture, and that to hold 
otherwise would emasculate the law of capture and extend the reach of the 
Conservation Act much further back than the legislature intended, severely impacting 
its clearly enunciated policies. 
C. Neither The Conservation Act Nor Case Law Imposes A Duty 
On A Unit Operator To Seek Spacing, 
A reading of the Conservation Act and the substantial body of case law on the 
issue suggest that an operator indeed has no duty to seek spacing, and that the law of 
capture is alive and well even beyond the stage of wildcat or exploratory wells. Yet, 
Bennion involved a pooling order made effective as of the date of production where the 
spacing order itself preceded the date of first production. 
6
 For a thorough and insightful analysis of the history of the law of capture and 
Cowling's effect on it in conjunction with the provisions of the Conservation Act, see 
Richards, et al., Oil and Gas Conservation in Utah After Cowling: The Law of Capture 
Receives a New Lease on Life, 14 J. En. Nat'l Res. & Env. Law 1 (1994). 
Petitioner argues that the Conservation Act imposes a duty on a unit operator to seek 
spacing. Petitioner fails to cite any case law or show how an operator is obligated to 
seek spacing, and particularly how a unit operator should seek spacing from the Board 
in light of the Federal requirements that are imposed upon the establishment of a unit in 
43 C.F.R. Subpart § 3181 (attached hereto as Addendum 1), and in light of the 
obligations under an approved unit agreement relating to the protection of the 
correlative rights of all participants of the Federal unit.7 Indeed, as effectively 
acknowledged in Cowling, there is no such duty. See discussion to that effect in 
Richards, et al., supra note 5, at 32, note 177. 
Petitioner's position is made more untenable by the relevant case law, including 
the holding in Cowling as well as the case of Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra, 
note 4. In that case, the court placed no duty upon the Board or upon the operator to 
"protect" Bennion's correlative rights, seek a pooling order, or otherwise. The court 
left it completely up to Bennion to protect himself; he would have to come back in a 
subsequent proceeding and specifically ask for a pooling order. Even where a spacing 
order was in place as in Bennion, the court still held that an adjoining landowner would 
7
 Under these circumstances, the correlative rights of any noncommitted owners 
would be more than amply protected by joining the unit. See discussion in III below. 
Petitioner's argument also ignores the overlying fact that a Federal unit, offering all of 
the protections and benefits to any interested owners that a Board spacing and pooling 
could offer if simply joined, was already present in this case, unlike the other Utah 
cases (including Cowling). The existence of the Federal unit effectively pre-empted any 
urgent necessity to seek "additional" spacing and makes the present action an even 
stronger case for denying retroactive pooling. 
himself have to seek a pooling order, rather than have the operator or even the Board 
on its own motion do so, before being entitled to a share of the proceeds of any 
production. The court strictly construed the Conservation Act and held that a request 
for an accounting under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 would not be construed as a request 
for pooling, and the court made no mention about any duty of an operator to do 
anything to protect the adjoining landowner's correlative rights, even following a 
request for an accounting on an established drilling unit. Thus, Petitioner's argument 
herein that Respondents had a duty to seek spacing at an earlier time is totally 
misplaced. 
As case law support, Petitioner can only cite dicta in Cowling stating that "the 
statutory scheme contemplates prompt action in the prosecution of a petition for a 
spacing order." 830 P.2d at 228. Petitioner attempts to show the court that such 
language squarely places a duty on an operator to expeditiously seek a spacing order. 
However, Petitioner's resort to the dicta in Cowling to reach that result misreads the 
holding in Cowling itself and ignores the much larger body of Utah cases (and cases 
from other jurisdictions) that hold there is no such duty. See, e.g., Cowling, 830 P.2d 
at 227, Richards, et aL, supra, note 6, at 30-32. Those cases in fact place a duty 
squarely on the landowners to protect themselves or be subject to a waiver, even if a 
spacing order {e.g., Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra) is in place. Scholars have 
reasoned that the Cowling dicta is "difficult to square" with its holding that the 
Conservation Act does not abrogate the law of capture prior to entry of a spacing order. 
See Richards, et aL, supra note 6, at 30-32. In short, Cowling does not support the 
proposition that the operator has such a duty; on the contrary it stands for the 
conclusion that no such duty exists. Id. 
D. The Utah Statute And Case Law Make Clear That Correlative 
Rights Are To Be Protected Through Action By The 
Landowners, Not By Retroactive Pooling, 
Contrary to Petitioner's arguments that retroactive pooling is required to insure 
that Petitioner receives his just and equitable share of production, Utah case law and the 
Conservation Act place that responsibility (or, more precisely, that "opportunity") 
squarely on the shoulders of the adjoining property owners. Cowling, supra.; Bennion 
v. ANR, supra; Bennion v. Graham Resources, Inc., supra; Adkins, supra. As stated 
by the court, "the utilization of the 'opportunity' depends upon the individual 
landowner." Adkins, supra,, 926 P.2d at 883. The Utah courts have appropriately and 
consistently found that it is improper and inequitable for an adjoining landowner or 
lessee thereof to attempt to "ride down a well." They simply must come forward to 
protect themselves. Id. In particular, Cowling makes clear that adjoining landowners 
should drill their own wells or actively seek to negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement, 
petition the Board for a spacing order, or, failing being able to enter into a voluntary 
pooling agreement, should affirmatively pursue a forced pooling order from the Board 
in order to take advantage of their correlative rights opportunity. 830 P.2d at 222; 226-
227.8 
E. The Landowners And The Petitioner Have Every Right And 
Opportunity To Seek Spacing And Pooling At Any Time, And 
Are In As Good A Position As The Respondents To Do So, 
Adjacent landowners can seek their own financing and drill their own well where 
no spacing order has been entered. They can take advantage of the opportunity they 
have to lease, obtain partners, and do anything that an "operator" can do — including 
being an operator themselves at any time. The statute allows both an operator and any 
interested landowner the opportunity to seek spacing and pooling at any time. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-6-6 and 6.5. The Landowners were in as good a position (or even 
better, since they had no obligations to the unit participants under the unit operating 
agreement) as Respondents to seek spacing. 
II. A POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THE POOLING ORDER 
RULE IN COWLING DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
A. Case Law Concerning Inequitable Conduct. 
The Cowling court only referenced two cases from other jurisdictions sustaining 
8
 Perhaps as telling as any of the pronouncements in Cowling or Bennion v. Graham 
Resources are Petitioner's own acknowledgments in his Response to Objection of River 
Gas in Cause No. 243-3, R. 206-207: 
"Petitioner is entitled to participate in the existing two wells by 
first establishing drilling and spacing units to determine his 
correlative rights and then paying his proportionate share of well 
costs under a mutually agreeable pooling agreement with 
Respondents or under a pooling order from the Board." 
Petitioner makes clear in that statement his understanding that he must come forth and 
establish his correlative rights through spacing and thereafter enter into a pooling 
agreement or obtain a pooling order from the Board, and then pay his proportionate 
share and any other amounts pursuant to the agreement or Board order. 
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retroactive pooling orders. Insofar as pertinent here,9 the case of In re Farmers 
Irrigation District, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972) was the only case referencing a 
possible "inequitable conduct" exception to the pooling order rule.10 A reading of the 
Cowling court's treatment of Farmers Irrigation and of Farmers Irrigation itself shows 
that it is clearly distinguishable from the present case and actually provides direct 
support for the Board's order in this case. 
The Cowling court and Farmers Irrigation both began their analyses by 
recognizing the inequity that would be caused by a retroactive pooling order allowing 
an "adjoining owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of drilling operations 
without asking for a pooling agreement...." 830 P.2d at 227 (quoting 194 N.W.2d at 
792). Thus, both cases recognized the looming inequity that would result when an 
adjoining landowner attempts to "ride down a well." 
Farmers Irrigation, in fact, spends considerable time addressing the inequity of 
"riding down a well": 
There is ordinarily no good reason why an adjoining owner 
should not ask for a voluntary pooling agreement at the time 
his neighbor starts to drill and thereby share in the expense, 
9
 The first case was from North Dakota, decided under a statute unlike Utah's, and 
was distinguished entirely on that basis. The statute in North Dakota established a 
procedure for and required the entry of a temporary spacing order within thirty days of 
the completion of a well. See 830 P.2d at 227, citing Texaco Inc. v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 448 N.W.2d 621, 623 (N.D. 1989). 
10
 Farmers Irrigation was also cited by Petitioner and amicus National Association of 
Royalty Owners ("NARO") as the only case of which they are aware that sustains a 
retroactive pooling order. 
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as well as in production, whether or not the well proves 
successful. The statutes clearly intend that rights shall be 
resolved upon an equitable basis. To permit an adjoining 
owner to sit back and await the successful outcome of 
drilling operations without asking for a pooling agreement 
would place the entire risk and the entire expense upon the 
party drilling in the event of an unsuccessful operation. 
This would ordinarily be inequitable and not justify a 
retroactive order. Section 57-909, RRS, 1943, contemplates 
than when an adjoining owner fails to enter into a voluntary 
pooling agreement, a spacing and pooling order may be 
entered on the application of any interested party. The 
drilling party may recover the share of the expense allocated 
to the adjoining owner by deducting it from the adjoining 
owner's share of the oil or gas produced. This enhances the 
risk taken by the drilling party who may encounter a dry 
well and is a factor which must also be considered in 
weighing equities. 
194 N.W.2d at 792 (emphasis added). 
While both Cowling and Farmers Irrigation viewed as inequitable an adjoining 
owner's delay in asking for a pooling agreement, and Cowling even stated that such a 
delay constituted a waiver of an adjoining landowner's correlative rights, the facts are 
several shades darker in the present case. Beyond mere delay in making a claim, the 
Landowners here have placed Respondents in an even more difficult position from an 
equity point of view by flatly refusing (or not responding to) reasonable good faith 
offers and sitting back and awaiting the outcome of the drilling. Worse yet, Petitioner 
entered upon the scene seeking to reap the benefits of Respondents' risk and 
investment, well after the fact of the establishment of production. Petitioner has no 
capital at risk, but is an opportunist seeking to reach back in time to improperly extract 
proceeds that he had no part in generating. Rewarding Petitioner in that manner would 
offend the major policies and intent of the Conservation Act and would produce an 
outcome that the legislature specifically intended to preclude. Under the facts of this 
case, both Cowling and Farmers Irrigation actually constitute authority to support the 
Board's Pooling Order, rather than otherwise.11 
B. "Obvious Delaying Tactics." 
The Cowling court observed, however, that Farmers Irrigation had sustained a 
pooling order retroactive to a date prior to a spacing order due to the operator's 
"obvious delaying tactics." 830 P.2d at 227. It further observed that the Utah 
statutory scheme allows the Board to enter a pooling order on terms that are "just and 
reasonable." The court went on to ascribe to the Board the power to "make 
appropriate adjustments as to the date the pooling order is effective." It stated: 
That is, a pooling order may be made effective prior to the 
entry of a spacing order to offset any inequitable delay by 
the operator in pursuing a petition for a spacing order. 
Id. at 228. Note the court's use of the discretionary word "may" as opposed to the 
mandatory word "shall." 
11
 The Landowners and the Petitioner in the present case have had at all times the 
same opportunity as provided in the Nebraska statute summarized in Farmers Irrigation 
to request that the agency order spacing and pooling at any time. See §§ 40-6-6(5) and 
40-6-6.5. The language quoted above in Farmers Irrigation plainly states that it would 
be inequitable to allow a retroactive pooling order in favor of an adjoining owner who 
has that opportunity and fails to take advantage of it. 194 N.W.2d at 792. Cowling 
clearly explained such inaction under Utah law would be a waiver of correlative rights. 
830 P.2d at 228. 
Having enumerated through this dictum a possible issue for future cases, the 
Cowling court could offer no more guidance on the subject, since the court specifically 
found there was no inequitable conduct exhibited in that case.12 Consequently, nothing 
in the facts or the holding in Cowling supports Petitioner's position in this case, and 
only one case from other jurisdictions (Farmers Irrigation) involving inequitable 
conduct is known. Against the backdrop stands the clearly-stated pooling order rule as 
well as the body of case law in a number of jurisdictions, including Utah, that upholds 
that rule; namely, that pooling may not be made retroactive prior to the corresponding 
spacing order, and the responsibility is squarely on a landowner or lessee to take action 
to protect his interest or be subject to a waiver. See Cowling, 830 P.2d at 227, and the 
cases cited thereat; Bennion v. Graham Resources, supra; Adkins, supra.13 
A realization that the facts of Farmers Irrigation contrast starkly with those of 
the present case should help resolve of this matter. In Farmers Irrigation, the adjoining 
landowner gave the operator "early notice" (194 N.W. 2d at 792) of its claim of an 
interest and its correlative rights within three months of commencement of production, 
and demanded a share of that production. Rather than negotiate or attempt in good 
faith to reach a solution, the operator disputed the adjoining landowner's ownership and 
12
 It therefore reiterated the "pooling order rule" and held that the Board erred as a 
matter of law requiring that the pooling order should be retroactive to the date of first 
production. 
3
 In nearly 30 years, it appears that no other state court has seen fit to follow the 
ruling of Farmers Irrigation. Three of the seven Nebraska Supreme Court Justices 
dissented from the opinion, and the very strongly worded dissenting opinion may 
explain a number of reasons why the case has not received a favorable acceptance. 
instituted protracted litigation which took over four years to conclude. Such were the 
"obvious delaying tactics" that the court disdained.14 194 N.W.2d at 789. More 
particularly, Farmers Irrigation really turned on the combination of those "delaying 
tactics" together with the promptness of the adjoining landowner in making a claim. 
194 N.W.2d at 792. Even then, the court did not see fit to make the pooling order 
retroactive to the date of first production, but rather, to the date that the non-operator 
first came forward to protect his interest. Id. Farmers Irrigation itself, then, is not a 
case of retroactive pooling. 
Farmers Irrigation was a case in which no equities ran in favor of the operator, 
but rather all of the equities ran in favor of the adjoining landowner. Given the strong 
three-justice dissent, if the landowner had waited longer to make a claim, it is plausible 
that the pooling order would have been made effective as of such later time, as is 
essentially the case here. Farmers Irrigation is thus a case that affirmatively supports 
the Respondents in this case and not the Petitioner, since the Board below also ordered 
pooling effective as of the date Petitioner stepped forward and obtained a spacing order, 
and not before. Farmers Irrigation in fact instructs that such an order should be 
upheld. 
14
 Thus, the "obvious delaying tactics" had nothing to do with the operator delaying an 
application for a spacing order, but rather, with delaying tactics making either party's 
application for a spacing order difficult or impossible until the outcome of protracted 
litigation instituted by the operator. 
C. The Equities In This Case. 
The equities in this case run completely in the opposite direction. Respondent 
River Gas invited Petitioner's Landowners on numerous occasions to join the DW Unit 
as participants on the same terms and conditions under which numerous other owners 
were joining, or to lease their interests, as described in the Statement of Facts above, 
beginning four years before drilling. After seeing all of the evidence and hearing all of 
the testimony in the administrative proceeding as described in the Statement of Facts 
above, the Board specifically found in Findings of Facts Nos. 5 through 11, the 
following [summarizing]: 
(a) That the offers and general terms and conditions made by Respondents to 
the Landowners were reasonable and in good faith; 
(b) That Respondents relied in good faith on the responses or lack of 
responses from the Landowners; 
(c) That the Landowners knew or reasonably should have known on or about 
the dates of drilling of each of the Wells, of the drilling of the Wells and 
of their various interests or potential interests relating to the same and of 
their physical location within the boundaries of the Federal Unit; and 
(d) That the Landowners failed to respond to the reasonable and good faith 
offers of Respondents. 
These findings have not been controverted by Petitioner in this appeal to any degree. 
Respondents did not delay any spacing application or create any obstacle to, or 
delay in, any spacing application made by Petitioner.15 Respondents engaged in no 
"obvious delaying tactics" as were involved in Farmers Irrigation. In short, 
Respondents engaged in no inequitable conduct whatsoever. Consequently, 
Respondents believe that the possible "inequitable conduct" exception to the pooling 
order rule clearly does not apply in the present case. 
D. The Board Did Not Err In Its Factual Findings That 
Respondents Dealt In Good Faith And Free Of Inequitable 
Conduct. 
Petitioner has not challenged any of the Findings of Fact Nos. 5 through 11 
described in II.C above, much less marshaled any evidence to show that "despite the 
supporting facts...the findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Petitioner 
has offered no reason why the court should overturn these factual findings.16 
The Record in this case is replete with substantial evidence sufficient to uphold 
these findings, as shown in the Statement of Facts above.17 The Landowners had every 
15
 Though Respondents opposed Petitioner's application for a spacing order as initially 
filed, based justifiably on the applicability of the Federal DW Unit and the Federal 
regulations governing the same, such opposition did not delay the making of the 
application nor did it delay the issuance of the Board's spacing order. Neither did 
Respondents appeal the Board's spacing order, which could have interposed delay or 
otherwise impacted the effectiveness of that order. 
16
 Although Petitioner argues that a failure to specifically offer an opportunity to 
participate in the two wells on a proportionate basis and to present an authorization for 
expenditure ("AFE") constitute bases for overturning the Board's order, these 
arguments are unavailing and by themselves do not controvert the factual findings of 
the Board. See discussion in IV below. 
17
 The Record, as described above in the Statement of Facts, contains documentation 
and testimony concerning the numerous efforts made by the unit operator on behalf of 
the Respondents to inform the Landowners of the unit operations, to offer them the 
opportunity to join the DW Unit as working interest owners on the same terms as all 
opportunity to participate fully in the drilling of the Wells and, even more, in the 
operation of the entire DW Unit. As much as the Petitioner and NARO might complain 
now that the offers and proposals made several years ago were not as attractive as they 
thought they should have been {see Petitioner's Brief at p. 39; NARO's Brief at p. 12), 
given that no responses from the Landowners were ever received, such a complaint 
lacks any foundation, even in the abstract. Here, moreover, the context further 
obliterates Petitioner's argument: numerous other owners accepted the proposals and 
offers of Respondents and the Landowners ultimately leased to Petitioner on no better 
terms that Respondents had many times previously offered. Respondents have 
marshaled and summarized in the Statement of Facts above some of the substantial 
evidence in the form of documentation, testimony in the transcript, copies of repeated 
letters and repeated certified letters, testimony concerning numerous telephone 
conversations, evidence of other owners accepting Respondents' proposals (including 
SITLA), and other items of evidence. This constitutes more than ample substantial 
evidence to adequately support and uphold the Board's findings of fact. Whitear, 
supra; Hurley, supra; Grace Drilling, supra; Sam Oil, supra; Bennion v. ANR, supra; 
Harken, supra; Zissi, supra. 
others, to explain to them the consequences of joining or not joining, to make them 
aware of the drilling that would be conducted in the immediate vicinity of their lands, 
or, alternatively, to lease or acquire their interests. Respondents also encouraged the 
Landowners to seek the advice of competent counsel if they felt they did not understand 
the significance of these communications. 
III. THE EXISTENCE OF THE FEDERAL UNIT AND THE 
EXPLORATORY NATURE OF THE WELLS FURTHER 
NEGATE ANY DUTY OF THE OPERATOR TO SEEK 
SPACING. 
A. The Existence Of The Federal Unit And The Numerous 
Opportunities Afforded To The Landowners To Join The Unit 
Vitiate Petitioner's Argument That Their Correlative Rights 
Were Not Protected. 
Unitization, in the context of a Federal exploratory unit, is the formation of a 
unit: 
by way of an agreement between owners of leasehold 
and overriding royalty or similar interests in oil and 
gas leases, including federal oil and gas leases, which 
agreement is approved by the United States in line 
with authorization and requirements of the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1920 as amended [30 U.S.C. § 181 et 
seq.]. The agreement involved is thus to be one for 
the joint exploration, development, and operation of 
an entire prospectively productive area of oil and/or 
gas. This unit area is to be operated as a single entity 
without regard to lease boundaries. The objective 
sought is to permit unified development and 
operation of an entire geological prospect [i.e. 
reservoir] so that exploration, drilling and 
production can proceed in the most efficient and 
economical manner by one operator. 
Coffield, "Selected Problems with Federal Exploratory Units," 35 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. 
Inst. 13-1, 13-2 through 3 (1985) (emphasis added). Costs are often reduced because 
the reservoir can be produced by utilizing the most efficient well spacing (as opposed to 
a fixed well) pattern and there is no requirement to drill unnecessary offset wells. 
Noted scholars have stated that conservation principals are most effectively 
addressed through unitization: 
Unitization of reservoirs...strikes directly at the root cause 
of the conservation problem. It seeks effectively to 
eliminate the multiplicity of competing interests for purposes 
of operating a common reservoir, while retaining separate 
interest for purposes of sharing equitable common costs and 
benefits. It creates a consolidated private interest which 
coincides with the public interest in conservation, thus 
enlisting the powerful force of profit-motivated private 
enterprise in a public cause, while directly by contract 
protecting correlative rights. It obviates the necessity for 
numerous negative rules and allows well density, the rate of 
extraction, the disposition of associated gas, and other 
matters relating to conservation to be adapted flexibly to the 
circumstances of each reservoir. Unitization is, in short, a 
positive instrument of petroleum conservation.18 
Of particular significance to this appeal, judicial recognition was accorded to acts of 
Congress and Department of Interior regulations as supporting Federal exploratory 
unitization as an important conservative measure, preventing waste of natural 
resources. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 931-933 (10th Cir. 
1954), cert, denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955) (involving a Federal exploratory unit in 
Utah). The Board has in fact found that the conservation of oil and gas and the 
prevention of waste is accomplished by operations conducted in accordance with the 
Wilson, "State Spacing Jurisdiction Over Conservation," Federal Onshore Oil and 
Gas Pooling and Unitization II, Paper No. 2 Pages 2-21 and 2-22 (Rocky Mt. Min. L. 
Fdn. 1990) (citing McDonald, "Petroleum Conservation in the United States, an 
Economic Analysis" 198 (1971)); see also Romanov, "Statutory Unitization: 
Significant Legal Issues," Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, Paper No. 12, 
Page 12-2 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 1985); see also Kutchins, "The Benefits and 
Risks of Federal Onshore Exploratory Units," 29 Rocky Mtn. Min. Law. Inst. 785, 
787-788 (Matthew Bender 1983). 
DW Unit Agreement (R. 69). 
The existence of the DW Unit and the inclusion of the land in question within 
that unit vitiates Petitioner's argument that his or the Landowners' correlative rights 
were in unprotected status. When the DW Unit was formed, care was taken, pursuant 
to Federal regulatory requirements, e.g. 43 C.F.R. § 3181.2 (see Addendum 1), to give 
the benefit of the doubt to include all areas, including the lands in question here, that 
reasonably should be included in the unit area based on the then known generalized 
geologic conditions (R. 573, Tr. 128-140). Under the DW Unit Agreement and Unit 
Operating Agreement (as in effect at the time the Landowners were invited to join), 
costs and production are allocated on pro-rata acreage basis (R. 118-130; R. 573; Tr. 
145). As outlined above, the Landowners were given numerous opportunities to lease 
or join the DW Unit and never expressed any objections to those terms. These factors 
clearly demonstrate Respondent's good faith to conserve natural resources, prevent 
waste and protect correlative rights, the same enunciated objectives of the Conservation 
Act (see Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1). Thus, it was entirely appropriate for Respondents 
to proceed with development of the captioned lands within the context of the Federal 
exploratory unit.19 
19
 In certain respects, carving out the land in question after the unit participants have 
had a long history of investing in unit development and the unit has been structured 
based on the total extent of the unit area, could be viewed as inequitable to the 
committed unit participants who have paid their fair share of the risks of unit 
development from the beginning. See, Cowling, supra; Farmers Irrigation, supra. 
1A 
Simply put, Respondents did not need to space, and indeed had no duty to space, 
since unitization accomplishes the same purposes and is a completely effective 
substitute for spacing. The Division acknowledged the formation of a Federal unit as 
de facto superceding any spacing (R. 573; Tr. 244). The Board's current rules provide 
for the suspension of spacing orders, and suspension of the Board's and Division's well 
siting rules, as to lands within a Federal unit, upon petition and hearing. See Utah 
Admin. Code Rule R649-2-3 (attached as Addendum 2 hereto) With respect to the 
lands in question herein, the Board, following a petition and hearing, entered its Order 
in Cause No. 243-2 on July 13, 1999, suspending all spacing within the DW Unit area 
(R. 60-79). That order was not superceded until the Board's Order entered in Cause 
No. 243-3, in which the Board spaced Landowners' land effective January 26, 2000, 
but expressly rejected Petitioner's request for retroactive effectiveness. (R. 223-234; 
230.) Notably, Petitioner did not appeal either order. 
Having made every reasonable effort to encourage the Landowners to join the 
unit, explaining to them on numerous occasions the significance of joining (which 
would have afforded them the same or better benefits than spacing and pooling), and 
having been rebuffed repeatedly by the Landowners, the unit operator had no duty to 
drag the Landowners into a spacing proceeding with the Boaid Having an approved 
Federal unit (in which spacing was superceded by a Board order in favor of the 
unitization structure), any spacing proceeding brought by Respondents would have been 
superfluous. The applicability of the Federal unit structure doubly negated any 
perceived duty of the Respondents to space in the present case. 
Petitioner in the alternative asserts it was incumbent upon River Gas to seek 
approval of the DW Unit before the Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-7 and 
8. As discussed in I.C above, no such duty exists under Cowling. Furthermore, at the 
time of its formation and until the Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 199820, 
much of the DW Unit area was subject to Federal leaseholds. There is no guarantee the 
Federal government would have consented to the Board's jurisdiction to approve a 
Federal exploratory unit pursuant to the cited statutes based on preemption. See 30 
U.S.C. § 226(m) (attached as Addendum 3 hereto); see also Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas 
Company v. United States, 675 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1982). Without the Federal 
government's consent, there would be no Federal exploratory unit. As a presumable 
consequence, Respondents are unaware of one single Federal exploratory unit that has 
come before the Board for approval. In fact, in a recent Board hearing, the BLM 
objected to compulsory unitization under Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-7 and 8 in the 
context of an exploratory unit, on the alleged basis that compulsory unitization is 
contrary to the purposes of such a unit {see BLM letter dated March 26, 2001 filed in 
Cause No. 245-2, attached as Addendum 4 hereto). 
Public Law No. 105-335 (112 Stat. 3139) 
li. The Board Did Not Err In Finding That The Wells Were 
Exploratory Wells; The Correlative Rights Were Not 
Ascertainable At The Time These Exploratory Wells Were 
Drilled; Respondents Had No Duty To Space On That Basis, 
Petitioner argues that the operator had a duty to space in this case since he 
believes "the correlative rights were ascertainable at the time the wells were drilled." 
Respondents believe this argument suffers from a number of fatal flaws. 
The correlative rights were not readily ascertainable at the time the wells were 
drilled. The evidence in the Board proceeding below established that the 5-94 and the 
5-266 Wells were exploratory wells carrying moderate risk. They are located on or 
near the geological limit of the Ferron formation. The Board specifically found that: 
At the time they were drilled, wells 5-94 and 5-266 were 
located near the edge of known coalbed methane gas field, 
and for purposes of imposing a risk penalty under the facts 
of this matter, and for no other purpose, wells 5-94 and 
5-266 constitute exploratory wells. At the time wells 5-94 
and 5-266 were drilled, Respondents incurred a moderate 
amount of risk that these wells would not produce sufficient 
coalbed methane gas to become production wells. 
(R. 561; Finding of Fact No. 15.) 
In his brief, Petitioner argues that there were numerous wells in the heart of the 
coalbed methane field on a 160-acre spacing. Petitioner appears to believe that the 
Wells, to be located at the very edge of the potential outer boundary of the coal seam 
where coal thickness and continuity were serious concerns, should also somehow have 
been considered, at the time of drilling, to be on a 160-acre drilling pattern. However, 
Petitioner has not specifically challenged Finding of Fact No. 15 of the Board to the 
effect that the Wells were exploratory wells, and that in drilling the wells Respondents 
incurred "a moderate amount of risk" that they would not produce sufficient coalbed 
methane gas to become production wells. 
Substantial evidence in the Record does exist to support this finding, including 
concerns over the thickness and extent of the coal seam in the area (R. 196-197; 203); 
concerns over the potential productivity of the Wells (R. 198-200); costs associated 
with removal and disposal of ever increasing amounts of water (R. 198; 200-202); and 
various other factors relating to geologic conditions, gas compression costs, and rising 
production costs in the area of the Wells (R. 192-195; 198-202). It was not at all clear 
at the time of drilling whether a 160-acre spacing or some different spacing would be 
appropriate, given that the Wells are at the very edge of the Ferron formation coal 
seam. (R. 203.) See the summary of Mr. Farrens' testimony in the Statement of Facts 
above. 
Petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in the record to any extent to 
specifically address these conditions in the vicinity of the wells and has therefore 
wholly failed to contest the Board's specific findings. Rather than attempt to marshal 
any such geological evidence relating to the area in the immediate vicinity of the Wells, 
Petitioner has instead attempted to divert the court's attention to the fact that there were 
numerous wells previously drilled on a 160-acre spacing in other areas of the DW Unit 
miles away from his lease. Such facts are only distantly connected to the conditions on 
the area in question here.21 The evidence in the record justifying the Board's findings 
that the Wells were exploratory, is substantial and constitutes the weight of the evidence 
on those matters. The Board's Finding of Fact No. 15 should be upheld; the Board did 
not err in this finding; there is substantial evidence in the Record to support it. 
Since the Wells were exploratory wells, the potential pool associated therewith 
was not readily ascertainable until after an appreciable amount of production history 
and experience with the Wells had been obtained. Petitioner in fact acknowledges, on 
page 17 of his brief that his correlative rights were not defined at the time of drilling, 
implicitly acknowledging that Respondents could have no duty to space in such a case. 
This court should not imply an obscure duty on the part of Respondents and thereby 
permit Petitioner to benefit from the inequity of "riding down a well," particularly 
exploratory wells such as the Wells in this case, or indeed any well in which he has not 
agreed in advance to participate. 
Petitioner's extrapolation from previously drilled wells in the heart of the Ferron 
formation, miles away {see, e.g., the legal descriptions of the locations of the other 
areas in the DW Unit that were being spaced, such as R. 28, 36, 37, 48, 49, and 51) 
from the area in which the 5-94 and 5-266 Wells were drilled, without any further 
technical documentation, does not suffice to demonstrate that the Board erred in finding 
that the wells were exploratory. Also, Petitioner neglects to consider in his arguments 
that the 160-acre spacing for those wells was mandated by a number of considerations, 
the most noteworthy of which were the numerous environmental concerns addressed in 
the Environmental Impact Statement for the Price Area Coalbed Methane Record Of 
Decision, which somewhat arbitrarily mandated 160-acre spacing in certain areas. (R. 
573; Tr. 188-189; 196-197.) 
IV. THE BOARD ACTED PROPERLY IN FINDING THAT 
PETITIONER AND THE LANDOWNERS WERE 
NONCONSENTING OWNERS AND IN IMPOSING A 
NONCONSENT PENALTY ON PETITIONER. 
A. Petitioner's Argument That An Operator Cannot Render An 
Adjoining Landowner Nonconsenting Unless Spacing And 
Drilling Units Are In Existence Is Without Merit. 
The Conservation Act contains a clear, concise definition of the term 
"nonconsenting owner": 
"Nonconsenting owner" means an owner who after written 
notice does not consent in advance to the drilling and 
operation of a well or agree to bear his proportionate share 
of the costs. 
§ 40-6-2(11) (emphasis added). After written notice, any party who merely (1) "does 
not consent in advance to the drilling and operation of a well," or (2) "agree to bear his 
proportionate share of the costs," by operation of the statute and by definition, is a 
nonconsenting owner. In this case, it is clear that the Landowners had written notice in 
advance that the Wells would be drilled. It is also clear that none of the Landowners 
consented in advance to the drilling and operation of either of the Wells or agreed to 
bear his or her proportionate share of the costs. Thus, by statutory definition, they are 
nonconsenting owners. The regulation at Utah Admin. Code R649-2-9 also includes as 
nonconsenting owners those who receive good faith offers to lease their interests. See 
Brief of Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, at pp. 21-27, which is incorporated herein by 
reference. Thus, the regulation goes even further in support of Respondents' position 
in this case, since the Landowners were offered a lease on numerous occasions on the 
sanctions that they ultimately leased to Petitioner. 
Nowhere in the statute, or the definition, or the regulation, or elsewhere, is it 
required (1) that the owner be offered to participate in a well (as opposed to merely 
receiving advance written notice); (2) that he be given notice of what his proportionate 
share might be; (3) that he be given notice of the precise location of the well; (4) that 
the owner receive in advance an authorization for expenditure ("AFE") covering the 
well; (5) that a spacing order or pooling order be established in advance; (6) that 
correlative rights be defined in advance; (7) that the well or wells in question be 
situated on lands which include lands in close proximity to the to the owner's land; 
(8) that such well or wells cannot be drilled in conjunction with numerous proposed 
wells in a unit potentially sharing a pool or coalbed methane horizon in common with 
property of the owner; (9) that the well in question cannot be part of the operations 
under a Federal unit; (10) that he be "sophisticated" or not "absentee"; or (11) any 
other of the "requirements" that Petitioner would have the court read into the statute 
and the definition. A nonconsenting owner is simply nothing more than a person who, 
after written notice, does not consent to the drilling and operation of "a well" or agree 
to share costs in "a well" (or agree to a lease as under the regulation), whether or not 
through participation in a unit agreement or otherwise. 
Petitioner would have this court preclude the Board from conferring 
nonconsenting owner status on any person unless a spacing and drilling unit are in 
existence for the well or wells in question, the correlative rights of the owner are fully-
established, and an AFE is sent. Consider the following suggestion propounded by 
Petitioner: 
No common pool or correlative rights in the land 
surrounding the wells had been defined as a matter of State 
law. Whether Mr. Hagerty's (Petitioner's) landowners were 
"owners" within the "pools" drained by the wells had not 
been determined. Accordingly, there was no legal basis 
under the Conservation Act for the Board's decision that 
Mr. Hagerty's landowners were "nonconsenting" at the time 
the wells were drilled and the Board erred as a matter of law 
in imposing a nonconsent penalty. 
Petitioner's Brief at p. 35 (emphasis added). 
Petitioner's position is that there would be "no legal basis" for the imposition of 
a nonconsent penalty on an owner who does not consent unless all the rights are defined 
in advance. Petitioner argues that for there to be an "owner," the "pool" must be 
defined, along with all of the correlative rights, before any drilling capable of being 
"consented to" can occur. In the absence of such a definition of correlative rights, 
under Petitioner's position, no nonconsent penalty could ever be imposed. 
If the court followed Petitioner's position, it would emasculate the major policy 
considerations of the Conservation Act, and one would wonder how many potential 
wells would ever be drilled. Petitioner would overturn long-standing decisions of this 
court under the Conservation Act and would administer a crippling blow to oil and gas 
development in the State. Petitioner's argument is totally misplaced and should not be 
adopted by this court.22 
In fact, Petitioner's argument puts the proverbial cart before the horse. A 
spacing order can only be sought based on data generated by a well that is already 
drilled on or near the lands sought to be spaced. See Cowling, at 226. Under 
Petitioner's theory, there could never be a "nonconsenting owner" in such a well. This 
clearly is not what the Legislature intended in the Conservation Act or the court in its 
holding in Cowling. 
R The Landowners Had Notice In Advance Concerning The 
Drilling Of The Wells And The Opportunity To Participate In 
The Wells Within The Meaning Of And In Compliance With 
The Conservation Act. 
As described above in Section I and II.C, Findings of Fact Nos. 5 through 11 
relating to the good faith offers and actions of Respondents are supported by substantial 
evidence in the Record, must be given deference by the court, and Petitioner has failed 
in his burden to marshal the evidence to overturn them. Rather than attempt to 
Moreover, Petitioner has it backwards. The more the uncertainty and risk, the 
higher the appropriate nonconsent penalty should be. Petitioner's argument ignores the 
simple fact that if a well is drilled in an unknown area or before correlative rights are 
defined, even greater risks are taken by the operator, both operationally and 
geologically with respect to percentages of ownership of the potential pool. The 
Conservation Act encourages production and fosters development and therefore its 
policy of rewarding risk is appropriate. If, after drilling and some history of 
production, it is determined that a nonconsenting owner's land does not extend over a 
discovered pool, he pays no nonconsent penalty since he has no rights in the pool. No 
harm has been done. If on the other hand, his land is found to cover an area in the 
pool, he has been greatly benefited by the risk taken by the operator, for which it is 
quite proper that the operator be rewarded. Both parties win. 
controvert these findings, Petitioner argues that somehow the language of Bennion v. 
ANR, supra, 819 P.2d at 348, and Sam Oil, supra, 817 P.2d at 304, note 4, makes it 
clear that a nonconsent penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed unless the mineral 
owner is "given the opportunity to elect to participate in the drilling," and that such 
opportunity must be on a well-by-well basis. Petitioner argues that no such opportunity 
was ever "given." 
Petitioner misconstrues the law and the facts of this case and misreads Bennion 
v. ANR, supra, and Sam Oil, supra. It is not the operator or any other party who 
"gives" such opportunity; it is the recognition of correlative rights through the 
enactment of the Conservation Act's provisions that "gives" such an opportunity. 
Under the law of capture alone, an adjoining landowner has no rights to participate in 
his neighbor's well, and a nonconsent penalty would have no meaning where 
production is not shared. 
The Conservation Act "gives" (or in the words of Bennion v. ANR, "grants") the 
adjoining landowner the option of participating in his neighbor's well, as a recognition 
by the state of correlative rights. The neighbor "gives" nothing; the statute does. 
However, it places no requirements on the neighbor to mail an AFE, send an engraved 
invitation, or otherwise. It only requires written notice, which the Landowners in this 
case received on numerous occasions. 
Where the parties are unable to negotiate an agreement, or if one party refuses 
AA 
or fails to respond, the statute provides a mechanism for the party proposing to drill a 
well to be able to do so. In this way, the drilling party is not unconstitutionally 
deprived, by reason of the intransigence of the other party, of his own property right to 
drill a well.23 
The statute, as written with a carefully-worded definition of "nonconsenting 
owner," adroitly balances the rights and interests of the various types of parties 
involved. The court need not, and should not, adopt the Petitioner's argument to read 
more into the statute than should be there, and thereby create some extra-statutory and 
special obligations on the part of drilling parties to coddle non-risk-taking parties, 
upsetting the balance that the legislature struck. The Conservation Act has been 
amended on more than one occasion in response to considerable history and experience 
over the past 46 years. All that is consciously and purposefully required by the statute 
23
 Petitioner once again has it backwards. The unconstitutionality would flow the 
other direction if a party were deprived, pursuant to the operation of a statute, of his 
right to drill on his own property due to the nonresponsiveness of his neighbor. Rather 
than deprive the drilling party of his right to drill, the statute provides his neighbor with 
the option to participate in the well. As cogently stated in Bennion v. ANR: 
That he had the option of participating in the costs of drilling or 
being subject to a penalty was a grant to him (at the expense of the 
participating working interest owners) because of the statute's 
recognition of correlative rights. 
819 P.2d at 347 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Nonconsenting owners are thus "given" (granted) by the statute the option to 
participate (at the expense of the participants in the well), thus avoiding the 
constitutional difficulty that depriving the participants the opportunity to drill would 
present. Moreover, it also avoids the "serious constitutional problem which would 
arise if the State simply compelled participation in a speculative venture." Id., 819 
P.2d at 347, n. 8, (citing 5 W. Summers, Oil and Gas ch. 29, § 975, at 128 (1966)) 
(emphasis added). 
is written notice followed by the failure to consent in advance or agree to share 
proportionately in the costs (or lease), in a unit or otherwise, without more. These 
requirements were satisfied in the present case, and Respondents believe that the 
Landowners were given adequate advance written notice and opportunity to participate 
in the Wells within the meaning of and in ample compliance with the Conservation Act. 
V. THE TERMS OF THE POOLING ORDER ARE JUST AND 
REASONABLE. 
Petitioner argues that the "terms" of the Pooling Order (essentially, the 225% 
nonconsent penalty) are unjust and unreasonable in that they penalize the 
"unsophisticated, absentee Landowners" and unduly reward Respondents who he 
believes should have sought spacing previously. He argues that the operator knew or 
should have known at the time the Wells were drilled that they would drain 160 acres, 
that the Wells were not wildcat wells, and that, with respect to the 5-266 Well, its 
location is particularly egregious in regard to its proximity to the Landowners' 
property. Petitioner also attempts to taint the motive of Respondents by suggesting that 
they opposed the spacing efforts of Petitioner and thereafter sought protection of the 
Conservation Act by seeking a nonconsent penalty. 
Once again, Petitioner's arguments are misplaced. As discussed above, 
Respondents tried on numerous occasions to get the Landowners to lease or participate 
in the DW Unit, and had no other affirmative duty to seek spacing at any time. The 
Board specifically found that the Wells carried a moderate amount of risk, and 
Petitioner has not marshaled any evidence to refute the Board's findings. Petitioner 
cites to no case that suggests that the nonconsent penalty imposed in the Pooling Order 
is inconsistent with the level of risk taken in the drilling of the Wells.24 
In Bennion v. ANR, supra, the court upheld the imposition by the Board of a 
175% nonconsent penalty upon the owner of an unleased mineral interest in a drilling 
unit for the second well drilled in such unit. The court found that, though a first well 
had been drilled in the unit that had been in production, even the drilling of a second 
well in the same unit was not risk-free, thereby justifying the 175% nonconsent penalty. 
The Conservation Act, § 40-6-6.5(4)(d)(i)(D), allows for a minimum of 150% 
and a maximum penalty of 300%, commonly referred to as a "nonconsent penalty," a 
"risk penalty" or "risk compensation." Sam Oil, supra, 817 P.2d at 302. "A 
nonconsent penalty is designed to ensure that non-participating owners do not benefit 
from the successful outcome of risk they do not take." Id. "The purpose of a 
nonconsent penalty is to balance the costs, benefits, and risks of drilling a well among 
the diverse parties. The nonconsenting parties avoid any risk; the participating parties 
assume it." Bennion v. ANR Production, supra, 819 P.2d at 348. "[T]he penalty 
provides an incentive for parties to participate in drilling, resulting in increased 
24
 Petitioner suggests that Cowling dealt with a "wildcat" well. However, even in 
Cowling, the well in question was completed in a known geologic formation, providing 
the BLM in that case with "some basis for surmising that [the well] might drain gas 
from under the BLM tract." 830 P.2d at 229. Petitioners' reliance upon Harken, 
supra, is also misplaced as that case dealt with the definition of "wildcat" well only for 
the purposes of qualifying Harken's well for a statutory "wildcat" well tax credit. 
production consistent with the public policy of this state." Id. at 348-349; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 ("It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, 
encourage and promote the development, production and utilization of natural resources 
of oil and gas in the state of Utah..."). The imposition of a nonconsent penalty on 
Petitioner and the Landowners accomplishes these purposes and is therefore 
appropriate. 
The percentage of nonconsent penalty must relate to the risks assumed by the 
consenting parties. As indicated above, and as shown at the Board hearing, 
Respondents assumed substantial risk in the drilling of the 5-94 and 5-266 wells. Both 
wells are located on the outer boundary of the DW Unit and, to that extent, were more 
exploratory in nature rather than development. See the summary of Mike Farrens' 
testimony in the Statement of Facts above relating to the substantial risks at the time of 
drilling associated with coal seam thickness, water disposal, gas gathering and 
compression, and production potential. 
To fail to impose a nonconsent penalty upon Petitioner would be unfair to 
Respondents. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
"[it] would unfairly injure the participating working interest 
owners to require them to absorb all the losses from the well 
but force them to share the profits. Such a result would 
encourage owners who might otherwise contribute to the 
costs of a well in advance to hold out until the results of 
drilling become known, because they would then be able to 
obtain the benefits of the well without the risk." 
Sam Oil} supra, 817 P.2d at 304. This is the same concern that was expressed in the 
policy of the Conservation Act, namely, owners must be encouraged to join units and 
participate or know, in the alternative, that they will be expected to compensate those 
who do for the associated risks they take. 
Given that the Board has special expertise in assessing and evaluating the risk of 
drilling, and given the Board's findings that the drilling of the Wells entailed moderate 
risk and that the Wells were exploratory Wells (see the description of Mr. Fan-ens' 
testimony in the Statement of Fact above), the Board's imposition of a 225% 
nonconsent penalty is entirely appropriate. Substantial evidence supports those findings 
as demonstrated in the Record, and the court should uphold, and give substantial 
deference to, those findings based on the Board's expertise, under the reasonableness 
and rationality standard. 
Petitioner and NARO also try to argue that the Pooling Order penalizes 
"unsophisticated, absentee" owners who seek the protection of the Conservation Act. 
The Pooling Order does not penalize. It grants Petitioner the right to participate, under 
conditions dictated largely by statute and as administered by the Board, in two wells 
neither he nor his Landowners took any risk in drilling and that are not located on their 
property. It rewards Petitioner and the Landowners for taking advantage of the 
opportunity afforded through the Conservation Act, and would have rewarded them 
sooner had they come forward sooner. Their self-styled status as "unsophisticated" or 
ACS 
"absentee" has no bearing on the operation of the statute or the Board's determinations. 
Moreover, Respondents tried every approach within reason to help inform the 
Landowners of their opportunities, answer questions, and respond to numerous 
telephone conversations, even to the point of suggesting that they seek competent 
counsel if there was anything they did not understand, as described above.25 None of 
these desperate arguments is availing to Petitioner, 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons described above and in the Brief of the Board, which 
Respondents adopt and incorporate in its entirety by reference herein, the Pooling 
Order of the Board should be upheld in its entirety and the Petitioner's requested relief 
should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of April, 2001. 
PRUITT^GUSHEE & BACHTELL 
FREDERICK M^MicDONALM#4876) 
GEORGEtS'. YOUNJG/(#3589)/ 
Attorneys for Respondents 
1850 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)531-8446 
25
 NARO states in its amicus brief that Respondents have "taken advantage" of "over 
100 mineral owners" uncommitted to the DW Unit in addition to Petitioner and the 
Landowners. This statement is unfounded, unsubstantiated, and borders on slanderous. 
It is belied by the numerous good faith efforts of Respondents that have been 
demonstrated and are uncontested in the Record. In fact, Respondents afforded all 
uncommitted owners in the DW Unit area the same "opportunities" that were afforded 
to the Landowners. 
so 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum 1: 43 C.F.R. Subpart 3181 (2000) 
Addendum 2: Utah Admin. Code R649-2-3. 
Addendum 3: 30 U.S.C. § 226(m) (2000). 
Addendum 4: Letter dated March 26, 2001 from Bureau of Land 
Management to Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. 
Tabl 
Subpart 3 iai—Application tor unir 
Agreement 
§3161.1 Preliminary consideration of 
unit agreement. 
The model unit agreement set forth 
in §3186.1 of this title, is acceptable for 
use in unproven areas. Unique situa-
tions requiring special provisions 
should be clearly identified, since these 
and other special conditions may ne-
cessitate a modification of the model 
unit agreement set forth in §3186.1 of 
this title. Any proposed special provi-
sions or other modifications of the 
model agreement should be submitted 
for preliminary consideration so that 
any necessary revision may be pre-
scribed prior to execution by the inter-
ested parties. Where Federal lands con-
stitute less than 10 percent of the total 
unit area, a non-Federal unit agree-
ment may be used. Upon submission of 
such an agreement, the authorized offi-
cer will take appropriate action to 
commit the Federal lands. 
§3181*2 Designation of unit area; 
depth of test welL 
An application for designation of an 
area as logically subject to develop-
ment under a unit agreement and for 
determination of the depth of a test 
well may be filed by a proponent of 
such an agreement at the proper BLM 
office. Such application shall be ac-
companied by a map or diagram on a 
scale of not less than 2 Inches to 1 mile, 
outlining the area sought to be des-
ignated under this section. The Fed-
eral, State, Indian and privately owned 
land should be indicated by distinctive 
symbols or colors. Federal and Indian 
oil and gas leases and lease applica-
tions should be identified by lease se-
rial numbers. Geologic information, in-
cluding the results of any geophysical 
surveys, and any other available infor-
mation showing that unitization is 
necessary and advisable in the public 
interest should be furnished.All infor-
mation submitted under this section is 
subject to part 2 of this title, which 
sets forth the rules of the Department 
of the Interior relating to public avail-
ability of information contained in De-
partmental records, as provided under 
this part at §3100.4 of this chapter. 
These data will be considered by the 
authorized officer and the applicant 
will be informed of the decision 
reached. The designation of an area, 
pursuant to an application filed under 
this section, shall not create an exclu-
sive right to submit an agreement for 
such area, nor preclude the inclusion of 
such area or any party thereof in an-
other unit area. 
§ 3181.3 Parties to unit agreement 
The owners of any right, title, or in-
terest in the oil and gas deposits to be 
unitized are regarded as proper parties 
to a proposed agreement. All such par-
ties must be invited to join the agree-
ment. If any party fails or refuses to 
join the agreement, the proponent of 
the agreement, at the time it is filed 
for approval, must submit evidence of 
reasonable effort made to obtain join-
der of such party and, when requested, 
the reasons for such nonjoinders. The 
address of each signatory party to the 
agreement should be inserted below the 
signature. Each signature should be at-
tested by at least one witness if not no-
tarized. The signing parties may exe-
cute any number of counterparts of the 
agreement with the same force and ef-
fect as if all parties signed the same 
document, or may execute a ratifica-
tion or consent in a separate instru-
ment with like force and effect. 
§3181.4 Inclusion of non-Federal 
lands. 
(a) Where State-owned land is to be 
unitized with Federal lands, approval 
of the agreement by appropriate State 
officials must be obtained prior to its 
submission to the proper BLM office 
for final approval. When authorized by 
the laws of the State in which the unit-
ized land is situated, appropriate provi-
sion may be made in the agreement, 
recognizing such laws to the extent 
that they are applicable to non-Federal 
unitized land. 
(b) When Indian lands are included, 
modification of the unit agreement 
will be required where appropriate. Ap-
proval of an agreement containing In-
dian lands by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs must be obtained prior to final ap-
proval by the authorized officer. 
§3181.5 Compensatory royalty pay-
ment for unleased Federal land. 
The unit agreement submitted by the 
unit proponent for approval by the au-
thorized officer shall provide for pay-
ment to the Federal Government of a 
12Vi percent royalty on production that 
would be attributable to unleased Fed-
eral lands in a PA of the unit if said 
lands were leased and committed to the 
unit agreement. The value of produc-
tion subject to compensatory royalty 
payment shall be determined pursuant 
to 30 CFR part 206, provided that no ad-
ditional royalty shall be due on any 
production subject to compensatory 
royalty under this provision. 
(58 FR 58632, Nov. 2, 1993, as amended at 59 
FR 16999, Apr. 11, 1994) 
Tab 2 
R649-2-3. Application Of Rules To Unit Agree-
ments. 
The board may suspend the application of the 
general rules or orders or any part thereof, with 
regard to any unit agreement approved by a duly 
authorized officer of the appropriate federal agency, so 
long as the conservation of oil or gas and the preven-
tion of waste is accomplished thereby, but such sus-
pension shall not relieve any operator from making 
such reports as are otherwise required by the general 
rules or orders, or as may reasonably be requested by 
the board or the division in order to keep the board 
and the division fully informed as to operations under 
such unit agreements. 
Tab 3 
30 U.S.C §226(m) (2000) 
(m) Cooperative or unit plan; authority of Secretary of the Interior to alter or 
modify; communitization or drilling agreements; term of lease, conditions; 
Secretary to approve operating, drilling, or development contracts, and 
subsurface storage 
For the purpose of more properly conserving the natural resources of any oil or gas 
pool, field, or like area, or any part thereof (whether or not any part of said oil or gas 
pool, field, or like area, is then subject to any cooperative or unit plan of development or 
operation), lessees thereof and their representatives may unite with each other, or 
jointly or separately with others, in collectively adopting and operating under a 
cooperative or unit plan of development or operation of such pool, field, or like area, or 
any part thereof, whenever determined and certified by the Secretary of the Interior to 
be necessary or advisable in the public interest. The Secretary is thereunto authorized, 
in his discretion, with the consent of the holders of leases involved, to establish, alter, 
change, or revoke drilling, producing, rental, minimum royalty, and royalty require-
ments of such leases and to make such regulations with reference to such leases, with 
like consent on the part of the lessees, in connection with the institution and operation of 
any such cooperative or unit plan as he may deem necessary or proper to secure the 
proper protection of the public interest. The Secretary may provide that oil and gas 
leases hereafter issued under this chapter shall contain a provision requiring the lessee 
to operate under such a reasonable cooperative or unit plan, and he may prescribe such 
a plan under which such lessee shall operate, which shall adequately protect the rights of 
all parties in interest, including the United States. 
Any plan authorized by the preceding paragraph which includes lands owned by the 
United States may, in the discretion of the Secretary, contain a provision whereby 
authority is vested in the Secretary of the Interior, or any such person, committee, or 
State or Federal officer or agency as may be designated in the plan, to alter or modify 
from time to time the rate of prospecting and development and the quantity and fate of 
production under such plan. All leases operated under any such plan approved or 
prescribed by the Secretary shall be excepted in determining holdings or control under 
the provisions of any section of this chapter. 
When separate tracts cannot be independently developed and operated in conformity 
with an established well-spacing or development program, any lease, or a portion 
thereof, may be pooled with other lands, whether or not owned by the United States, 
under a communitization or drilling agreement providing for an apportionment of 
production or royalties among the separate tracts of land comprising the drilling or 
spacing unit when determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be in the public 
interest, and operations or production pursuant to such an agreement shall be deemed to 
be operations or production as to each such lease committed thereto. 
Any lease issued for a term of twenty years, or any renewal thereof, or any portion of 
such lease that has become the subject of a cooperative or unit plan of development or 
operation of a pool, field, or like area, which plan has the approval of the Secretary of 
the Interior, shall continue in force until the termination of such plan. Any other lease 
issued under any section of this chapter which has heretofore or may hereafter be 
committed to any such plan that contains a general provision for allocation of oil or gas 
shall continue in force and effect as to the land committed so long as the lease remains 
subject to the plan: Provided, That production is had in paying quantities under the 
plan prior to the expiration date of the term of such lease. Any lease heretofore or 
hereafter committed to any such plan embracing lands that are in part within and in 
part outside of the area covered by any such plan shall be segregated into separate 
leases as to the lands committed and the lands not committed as of the effective date of 
unitization: Provided, however, That any such lease as to the nonunitized portion shall 
continue in force and effect for the term thereof but for not less than two years from the 
date of such segregation and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying 
quantities. The minimum royalty or discovery rental under any lease that has become 
subject to any cooperative or unit plan of development or operation, or other plan that 
contains a general provision for allocation of oil or gas, shall be payable only with 
respect to the lands subject to such lease to which oil or gas shall be allocated under 
such plan. Any lease which shall be eliminated from any such approved or prescribed 
plan, of from any communitization or drilling agreement authorized by this section, and 
any lease which shall be in effect at the termination of any such approved or prescribed 
plan, or at the termination Of any such communitization or drilling agreement, unless 
relinquished, shall continue in effect for the original term thereof, but for not less than 
two years, and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities. 
The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, on such conditions as he may 
prescribe, to approve operating, drilling, or development contracts made by one or more 
lessees of oil or gas leases, with one or more persons, associations, or corporations 
whenever, in his discretion, the conservation of natural products or the public conve-
nience or necessity may require it or the interests of the United States may be best 
subserved thereby. All leases operated under such approved operating, drilling, or 
development contracts, and interests thereunder, shall be excepted in determining 
holdings or control under the provisions of this chapter. 
The Secretary of the Interior, to avoid waste or to promote conservation of natural 
resources, may authorize the subsurface storage of oil or gas, whether or not produced 
from federally owned lands, in lands leased or subject to lease under this chapter. Such 
authorization may provide for the payment of a storage fee or rental on such stored oil 
or gas or, in lieu of such fee or rental, for a royalty other than that prescribed in the 
lease when such stored oil or gas is produced in conjunction with oil or gas not 
previously produced. Any lease on which storage is so authorized shall be extendpH at 
least for the period of storage and" so long thereafter as oil or gas not previously 
produced is produced in paying quantities. 
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Tab 4 
^olv^. 
United States Department of the Interior 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
Utah State Office 
P.O. Box 45155 
Salt Lake City, UT 841454155 F ILED 
MAR 2 7 2001 IN REPLY REFER TO: 
? i ° M m SECRETARY BOARD OF 
IV1'™) OILf GAS & MINING 
March 26.2001 
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining 
Department of Natural Resources 
P.O. Box 145801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5801 
Re: Huntington (Shallow) CBM Exploratory Unit Emery Cc „_,, 
Utah Docket No. 2001-007 
Gentlemen: 
Texaco Exploration and Production Company is presenting and proposing an exploratory unit for 
certain lands in Emery County, Utah to explore and develop natural gas resources contained in the 
Fenon Formation. In conjunction with the proposed exploratory unit they are requesting that a 
compulsory unitization provision be applied to the unit area under Utah Code Aim. 40-6-8. We do 
not support the compulsory unitization for the reference unit. It is counter to the concept and design 
of what exploratory units are formed to accomplish. We also do not believe the criteria as outlined 
in 40-6-8 has been wholly satisfied. Enclosed is a copy of a letter we sent to Texaco Exploration and 
Production Company and the Division of Oil Gas and Mining expressing some of our concerns. 
Under our guidelines, we approve all unit agreements involving Federal lands independent of the 
amount of acreage involved. Units with limited Federal acreage (< 10%) may not require the use 
of the Federal format for agreements in unpro ven areas contained in our Code of Federal Regulations 
(43CFR 3186.1). As presented, we will not consent to or approve the proposed Huntington 
(Shallow) CBM exploratory unit with the compulsory unitization clause or order affixed to the unit 
agreement area. Our position is that no exploratory unit should be encumbered with compulsory 
unitization. Land pooling should be pursued under Utah Code Ann. 40-6-6. 
Sincerely, 
R.A/nenricks 
Chief, Branch of Fluid Minerals 
Enclosure 
